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Samir Okasha’s latest book focuses on the role of agency in evolutionary biology. 
Agents and Goals in Evolution is essential reading for philosophers and biologists 
interested in subjects where reference to agency occurs, including fitness optimi-
zation, kin selection, and social evolution. It also touches on the relation between 
rationality and evolution, which could make it of interest to scholars working out-
side evolutionary biology but seeking to understand the appeal to evolution in differ-
ent scientific fields.
The main aim of the book is to provide a philosophical analysis of what Oka-
sha calls ‘agential thinking’. This involves treating biological units as rational agents 
with interests and goals that they try to accomplish by different means. The major 
consequence of agential thinking is the import of concepts that are supposed to 
explain human behaviour to the biological world—from bacteria to lions. This is 
accompanied by the use of intentional language, typical of human beings pursuing 
their desires. Biologists do not just say ‘I want get a research grant’, but also ‘the 
bacteria that I study mutate because they want to grow faster’. This might sound 
inappropriate, but this way of thinking and speaking is pervasive in evolutionary 
biology. Agents and Goals in Evolution provides a great introduction to and analysis 
of the problem of agency at the intersection of philosophy and biology. It would be 
impossible to address all the issues raised by the book in this review, so I will briefly 
summarize the main parts of the book and then comment on some of the aspects that 
I found most stimulating.
The first part of the book constitutes an introduction to the world of agency in 
evolutionary biology. The author reviews the different concepts of agency and the 
various problems related to it, such as whether agency should be ascribed only to 
organisms or maybe also to other units, like genes or groups (such as social insects). 
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He introduces the concept of unity-of-purpose, which is supposed to clarify the 
cases when it makes sense to treat a given unit as an agent. But most importantly, 
in this part he introduces a distinction between agential thinking of type 1 and agen-
tial thinking of type 2. In Okasha’s view, type 1 agential thinking occurs when we 
treat evolved entities as agents, whereas type 2 happens when we treat the process 
of natural selection as the agent itself. Okasha argues that the more useful sense of 
agential thinking is type 1.
The second part of the book is focused on the controversial (but popular) idea 
that natural selection is an optimizing process that will tend to maximize fitness, 
which might be considered the goal that natural selection strives towards. A lot of 
issues related to the notion of agency are explored in this part of the book, including 
Hamilton’s claim that organisms behave as if they want to maximize their inclusive 
fitness, and Fisher’s ‘Fundamental Theorem of natural selection’. This analysis leads 
Okasha to many interesting conclusions. The one that I found the most interesting is 
the idea that there is no general theoretical principle suggesting that natural selec-
tion will lead to the evolution of adaptations. Adaptationist claims must be scruti-
nized empirically, not theoretically. This philosophical position will, no doubt, lead 
to many discussions in the future.
The third part of the book focuses on analysing the relationship between evolu-
tionary optimal behaviour and rational behaviour. One might distinguish here two 
main themes. First, the understanding of how rationality, understood as a phenotypic 
trait that characterises some organisms, evolved. And second, the examination of 
how agential thinking is used as a heuristic tool for understanding adaptive behav-
iour. Okasha tries to clarify the relationship between these two themes, putting for-
ward the hypothesis that adaptive behaviour is a form of proto-rationality. This part 
of the book explores a wide arrange of interesting claims, including the suggestion 
that irrational behaviour can sometimes be an evolutionary optimal behaviour.
I found some Okasha’s ideas especially illuminating. One of them is the concept 
of unity-of-purpose, which is supposed to explain the circumstances under which it is 
justified treating an entity as an agent, mainly when all its traits evolved to contribute to 
the same goal—enhancing the fitness of individual. This explains why biologists treat 
cats, for example, as agents. The reason is that cats exhibit a lot of traits that evolved 
to enhance their fitness, e.g., muscles that allow them to move, a digestive system that 
allow them to process food, and so on. Overall, cats seem to be well integrated and 
organized units made of elements that contribute to increasing their fitness. However, 
there are cases when it does not make sense to consider typical organisms as agents. 
For example, outlaw genes might break an organism’s unity-of-purpose because they 
might promote their fitness enhancement (e.g. by distorting sex ratios in offspring as 
maternally inherited elements sometimes do) at the expense of the whole of which they 
are a part. In these cases, the organisms-as-agents heuristic might not be so appropri-
ate. Fortunately, organisms contain mechanisms that eliminate what could be referred 
to as ‘within agent agency’, so treating them as agents will work in the majority of 
cases. Nevertheless, sometimes agency at different levels of the hierarchy might occur 
and this concept could be useful to spot its occurrence. One of the levels that would be 
interesting to explore under this framework is the level of the holobiont (a unit made of 
a host plus its symbiotic microbes), which some people consider to be bona fide indi-
viduals. Can holobionts be agents in evolution?
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One issue that is left unresolved is the relationship between agency and the units/lev-
els of selection debate. Okasha writes (p. 43): “an obvious suggestion is that once we 
have identified the relevant level of selection/adaptation in any particular case, this will 
immediately yield the right candidate for the role of agent, if we wish to apply agen-
tial thinking”. However, after stating that the units/levels of selection debate is com-
plex, Okasha decides to take a different route in the book. Nevertheless, the question 
remains: what is the relationship between these two concepts? One obvious solution is 
to equate the two concepts. And I think that this makes some sense, as some biologists 
and philosophers (including this reviewer) have argued that to be a unit of selection a 
given entity must be composed of elements that share a ‘common evolutionary fate’. 
In other words, an entity is a unit of selection if the elements that compose it depend 
on each other to the extent that they can increase their fitness only if they increase the 
fitness of the whole. As a result, in this view, a unit of selection would be an agent 
because it would fulfil the requirements of unity-of-purpose. However, not everyone 
would agree that those ‘strict’ requirements are necessary to be a unit of selection. If 
so, then the extension of those two concepts would be far more overlapping. Some units 
of selection might be agents, others might not. Whatever the proper answer is, this will 
definitely be an interesting topic to explore in the future.
The other idea that I found particularly appealing is Okasha’s aforementioned con-
ceptual distinction between agential thinking of type 1 and agential thinking of type 2, 
as it removes an important source of potential confusion. Throughout the book Oka-
sha offers arguments in favour of agential thinking 1, such as the fact organisms have 
evolved to do certain things (e.g. getting food, mating, etc.). They behave like agents 
and thus treating them in such a manner seems justified. The same, however, cannot 
be said about the agential thinking of type 2 which, as Okasha concludes, “works well 
if we confine attention to the simplest sorts of natural selection in which the selective 
environment is constant and the complexities of inheritance are ignored” (p. 230).
While I find this conceptual division and the arguments in favour of agential think-
ing of type 1 and against the type 2 persuasive, I am not convinced that agential think-
ing of type 2 should be limited to simple instances of natural selection. I think there is 
more room for this type of heuristic in evolutionary biology. For example, we might say 
that the goal of natural selection is to shift a frequency of phenotypes/genotypes to a 
different one in the next generation owing to fitness differences, but this may not always 
happen because of drift. Here natural selection seems goal-oriented while drift does 
not. In this way, thinking in terms of goals that natural selection pursues can help make 
clear the distinction between selection and drift. Even if I am wrong about this, the 
point I wish to emphasise is that evolutionary biology is perhaps broader than the anal-
ysis afforded by Okasha in his book. Thus, while his arguments are persuasive, they do 
not lead me to automatically remove agential thinking of type 2 from my ‘conceptual 
toolbox’. Instead, it invites me to seek cases where this type of thinking might have a 
real value. And, for this, I am grateful to the author.
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